Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS) is a top-tier annual conference in machine learning. The 2016 edition of the conference comprised more than 2,400 paper submissions, 3,000 reviewers, and 8,000 attendees, representing a growth of nearly 40% in terms of submissions, 96% in terms of reviewers, and over 100% in terms of attendees as compared to the previous year. In this report, we analyze several aspects of the data collected during the review process, including an experiment investigating the efficacy of collecting ordinal rankings from reviewers (vs. usual scores aka cardinal rankings). Our goal is to check the soundness of the review process we implemented and, in going so, provide insights that may be useful in the design of the review process of subsequent conferences. We introduce a number of metrics that could be used for monitoring improvements when new ideas are introduced.
Introduction
The review process for NIPS 2016 involved 2,425 papers submitted by 5,756 authors, 100 area chairs, and 3,242 active reviewers submitting 13,674 reviews in total. Designing an as-fair-as-possible review process at this scale is a challenge. In order to scale, all parts of the process have to be as decentralized as possible. Just to get a feeling, if the two program chairs were supposed to take final decisions just for the 5% most challenging submissions, this means that they would have to read and decide on 150 papers -this is the scale of a whole conference such as COLT. Furthermore, the complexity of the logistics and software to manage the review process is rather high already. As a controlled experiment from NIPS 2014 has shown, there is a high disagreement between area chairs and reviewers. Hence the primary goal must be to keep bias and variance of the decisions as small as possible.
Nihar Shah, Behzad Tabibian and Krikamol Muandet performed most of the data analysis reported in this paper. Behzad Tabibian and Krikamol Muandet were also the workflow team of NIPS 2016 and were responsible for all the programs, scripts and CMT-related issues during the review process. Isabelle Guyon and Ulrike von Luxburg were the program chairs of NIPS 2016.
In this paper, we present an analysis of many aspects of the data collected throughout the review phase of the NIPS 2016 conference, performed subsequent to the completion of the review process. Before delving into the details, the reader should importantly note the following limitations of this analysis:
• There is no ground truth ranking of the papers or knowledge of the set of papers which should ideally have been accepted.
• The analysis is post hoc, unlike the controlled experiment from NIPS 2014.
• The analysis primarily evaluates the ratings and rankings provided by reviewers, and does not study the textual comments provided by the reviewers.
While it is hard to come to firm conclusions with these limitations, the analysis is helpful to obtain interesting insights into the process and useful suggestions for subsequent conferences.
In what follows, we highlight the main findings of the analysis in Section 2. We subsequently enter into more details, with an overview of the review procedure at NIPS 2016 in Section 3 and an elaborate description of the analysis and the results in Section 4. We conclude the paper with a discussion in Section 5.
Highlights
Our analysis addresses many facets of the review process, but we address mainly quality assurance and quality control issues and derive recommendations for future program chairs from our observations. Quality assurance (QA) is "the process (or set of processes) used to measure and assure the quality of a product". 2 In our case, the "product" the set of accepted papers. QA should concern all designs, tools and metrics used before decisions are rendered in order to assure that the papers accepted meet strict criteria of quality. Quality control (QC) is "the process of ensuring that products and services meet consumer expectations". This should concern all tools and metrics used after decisions are made, in view of how they are received by the community.
Quality assurance. All the following can help improve and monitor the the soundness assignment of papers to reviewers and ACs, the coherence of the reviews, and catch possible mistakes. Some of these analyses have been done retrospectively, but in the future, they could be performed before decisions are made final.
• Bias in the review process/calibration. Section 4.1 reveals that the distribution of accepted papers by topic is representative of the general distribution of papers, which is reassuring. Section 4.8 confirms the good connectedness of reviewer-paper graph, which favors the selfcalibration of the review process. Section 4.6 compares ordinal ranking (a total ranking without ties provided voluntarily by reviewers as supplementary information) with cardinal scores (used as part of the regular decision process) and suggests using both as a means of debiasing/calibrating reviews better.
• Variance in the review process. We evaluate whether doubling the number of reviews was an effective step towards reducing variance in the review process. We perform analyses based on the mean of agreement between reviewers who rated the same papers. Our review process design introduced two pools of reviewers (invited and volunteer). Our analysis of Section 4.4 reveals no significant difference between the two pools. 3 This finding is corroborated by the results of Section 4.3, which indicate that there is less variance in the middle range of the reviews than the NIPS 2014 experiment would have predicted. 4 • Error catching/outliers. In Section 4.7 we propose and evaluate means of automatic sanity check using a combination of ratings and rankings to catch blatant inconsistencies.
Quality control. With our data-driven analysis, we address in this paper some of the fears and frustrations of the authors, reviewers, and area chairs.
• Unfair rejections. Some authors perceived the review process as unfair because their highly rated paper was rejected. This apparent discrepancy between reviewer scores and area chair decision is largely due to poor score normalization (Section 4.2). The reviewers were instructed to give a score of 3 or higher to the top 30% papers. As it turns out about 60% of the papers received a score of 3 or higher. Hence many highly rated papers ended up being rejected because of our low acceptance rate (of the order of 20%). Two possible solutions to circumvent this problem are to improve the calibration of reviewers (perhaps by providing a better rubric description) and to report the paper's quantiles instead of scores to the authors.
• Random decisions. Some authors believe that, for mid-range papers, the decision process is largely random. Our evaluation of the "messy middle" model (Section 4.3) indicates that the fraction of papers in the uncertain messy middle region is not as large as what the NIPS 2014 experiment would have predicted.
• Rebuttal and discussions. Some authors perceive that their rebuttal is not taken into account by the reviewers and the area chairs. Indeed, there is very little change in scores after rebuttal (less than 900 out of 13,000 reviews). Although we do notice a positive correlation between the change and the eventual acceptance (Section 4.5.2). Moreover, some papers were actively discussed, which may have contributed to reaching a consensus among reviewers, avoiding errors, and influencing the area chairs' decisions.
• Volunteer reviewers. Some area chairs were skeptical about the introduction of volunteer reviewers (Pool 2) to supplement invited reviewers (Pool 1) and generally trusted more senior reviewers. We find no significant differences between the two pools of reviewers in terms of agreement (Section 4.4). However, experienced reviewers and senior researchers participated much more in discussions than new reviewers and students (Section 4.5.1).
Review procedure
In this section, we present an overview of the design of the review process at NIPS 2016.
Selecting area chairs and reviewers
Area Chairs (ACs) are the backbone of the NIPS reviewing process. Their role is similar to that of an associate editor for a journal. Each AC typically handles 20-30 submissions, so with an estimated number of submission between 2000 and 3000, we needed to recruit about 100 area chairs. As it is impossible to intimately know all the diverse research areas covered by NIPS, we came up with the following procedure. We asked the NIPS Board and all the ACs of NIPS from the past two years to nominate potential ACs for this year. In this manner, we covered the entire variety of NIPS topics and obtained qualified suggestions. We obtained around 350 suggestions. We asked the NIPS Board to go through the list of suggested ACs and vote in favor of suggested ACs. We also accounted for the distribution of subject areas of submitted papers of the previous year's NIPS conference. Combining all these inputs, we compiled a final list of ACs: by the end of January we had recruited exactly 100 ACs. In a subsequent step, we formed "buddy pairs" among the ACs. Based on the ACs preferences, each AC got assigned a buddy AC. We revisit the role of buddy pairs in more detail later.
The process of recruiting reviewers is time consuming, it essentially went on from January until the submission deadline at end of May. A significant departure from the review processes of NIPS from earlier years, this time we had two kinds of reviewers, "invited senior reviewers" (Pool 1) and "volunteer reviewers" (Pool 2):
• Pool 1, invited senior reviewers: We asked all ACs to suggest at least 30 reviewers each who have completed PhDs. We obtained 2500 suggested experienced reviewers. We invited all of them, and 1100 accepted. We then asked all confirmed reviewers to "clone themselves" by inviting at least one researcher with a similar research background and with at least as good a qualification as themselves. This resulted in an additional 500 experienced reviewers.
• Pool 2, volunteer author-reviewers: The rapid growth in the number of submissions at NIPS poses the formidable challenge of accordingly scaling the number of reviewers. An obvious means to achieve this objective is to ask authors to become reviewers as well. This idea has been used in the past, for example, to evaluate NSF grant proposals (Mervis, 2014) or to allocate telescope time (Merrifield and Saari, 2009) . In order to implement this idea, without constraining unwilling authors, we requested authors to volunteer during the submission process by naming at least one author per paper as volunteer reviewers. We ended up with 3000 nominations. The day after the submission deadline, we invited all of them formally, and about 2000 of the volunteers accepted the invitation and were involved in the review process. A positive consequence of including volunteer author-reviewers was that it increased the transparency of the review process to authors.
The area chairs were aware of the respective pools to which each of their reviewers belonged. All in all, the number of reviewers that we eventually ended up with are as follows:
Senior researchers / faculty
Junior researchers / postdocs PhD students Pool 1: Invited reviewers 930 600 -Pool 2: Volunteer reviewers 400 250 1200
Assignment of papers to reviewers and area chairs
The assignment of papers to area chairs was made in the following manner. First, based on subject areas and the Toronto paper matching system (TPMS), a similarity score was computed for every AC with every submitted paper. Additionally, ACs were allowed to bid for papers they wanted to handle. A preliminary paper assignment was then produced in an automated manner, taking into account the similarity scores and the bidding scores. The procedure employed the algorithm used in previous years for assignments of reviewers (with different parameter values). 5 The algorithm uses following formula to score (and then rank) papers for each reviewer:
where s affinity ∈ [0, 1] is the score obtained from the TPMS for the {paper,reviewer} pair, s subject ∈ [0, 1] is the score obtained by comparing the subject areas of the paper and the subject areas selected by reviewer, and b ∈ [−1, 1] is the bidding score provided by the reviewer.
Finally, the ACs were given a provision to decline handling certain papers for various reasons such as conflicts of interest. These papers were re-assigned manually by the program chairs.
The procedure of assigning papers to reviewers was quite different from that employed the previous year. In NIPS 2016, the AC of each paper was responsible to first assign one senior, highly qualified reviewer manually. Two more invited reviewers from Pool 1 were then assigned automatically to each paper using a combination of subject similarity, the reviewers' bidding preferences, and similarity scores computed by the TPMS. Three volunteer reviewers from Pool 2 were also assigned automatically to each paper via a similar procedure. The ACs were asked to verify whether each of their assigned papers had at least 3 highly competent reviewers; the ACs could manually change reviewer assignments to ensure that this is the case. During the decision process, additional "emergency reviewers" were invited to provide complementary reviews if some of the reviewers had defected or if no consensus was reached among the selected reviewers.
We now present some basic statistics pertaining to the bidding and paper assignment process. Prior to the review process, reviewers were allowed to see the list of submitted papers and "bid" whether they were interested or disinterested in reviewing any paper. For any paper, a reviewer could either indicate "Not Willing" or "In-a-pinch" -which we count as negative bids, or indicate "Willing" or "Eager" -which we count as positive bids, or choose to not bid for that paper. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of number of bids on papers submitted by area chairs and reviewers. From the data, we observe a far higher number of negative bids as compared to positive bids. Panels (a) and (b) of the figure depict the distribution of counts per paper for reviewers and area chairs respectively; panels (c) and (d) depict the distribution per area chairs and reviewers. Figure 2 depicts the histograms of the number of reviewers assigned per paper, and the number of reviews handled each reviewer. Histogram of number of positive and negative bids (x-axis) per entity (counts on y-axis; on a logarithmic scale) for various entities. The "Not Willing" and "In-a-pinch" bids were considered negative bids, whereas "Willing" and "Eager" bids were considered positive bids. There were far more negative bids than positive bids. 
Review criteria and scores
We completely changed the scoring method this year. In previous years, NIPS papers were rated using a single score between 1 and 10. A single score alone did not allow reviewers to give a differentiated quantitative appreciation on various aspect of paper quality. Furthermore, the role of the ACs was implicitly to combine the decisions of the reviewers (late integration) rather than combining the reviews to make the final decision (early integration). Introducing multiple scores allowed us to better separate the roles: the reviewers were in charge of evaluating the papers; the ACs were in charge of making decisions based on all the evaluations. Furthermore the multiple specialized scores allowed the ACs to guide reviewers to focus discussions on "facts" rather than "opinion" in the discussion phase. We asked reviewers to provide a separate score for each of the following four features:
• Technical quality, • Novelty/originality, • Potential impact or usefulness,
• Clarity and presentation.
The scores were on a scale of 1 to 5, with the following rubric provided to the reviewers: The scores had to be complemented by justifications in designated text boxes. We also asked the reviewers to flag "fatal flaws" in the papers they reviewed. For each paper, we also asked the reviewers to declare their overall "level of confidence": 3 = Expert (read the paper in detail, know the area, quite certain of opinion) 2 = Confident (read it all, understood it all reasonably well) 1 = Less confident (might not have understood significant parts).
Discussions and rebuttals
Once most reviews were in, authors had the opportunity to look at the reviews and write a rebuttal. One section of the rebuttal was revealed to all the reviewers of the paper, and a second section was private and visible only to the ACs. Some reviews were still missing at this point, but it would not have helped to delay the rebuttal deadline as the missing reviews trickled in only slowly. Subsequently, ACs and reviewers engaged in discussions about the pros and cons of the submitted papers. To support the ACs, we sent individual reports to all area chairs to flag papers whose reviews were of too low confidence, too high variance or where reviews were still missing. In many cases, area chairs recruited additional emergency reviewers to increase the overall quality of the decisions.
All in all, the authors of 2188 papers submitted a rebuttal, and for 1822 papers there was discussion between reviewers.
Decision procedure
We introduced a decentralized decision process based on pairs of ACs ("buddy pairs"). Each AC got assigned one buddy AC. Each pair of buddy ACs was responsible for all papers in their joint bag, and made the accept/reject decisions jointly, following guidelines given by the program chairs. Difficult cases were taken to the program chairs, which included cases involving conflicts of interest and plagiarism. In order to harmonize decisions across buddy pairs, all area chairs had access to various statistics and histograms over the set of their papers and the set of all submitted papers. To decide which accepted paper would get an oral presentation, each buddy pair was asked to champion one or two papers from their joint bag as a candidate for an oral presentation. The final selection was then made by the program chairs, with the goals of exhibiting the diversity of NIPS papers and exposing the community with novel and thought provoking ideas. In the end, 568 papers got accepted to the conference, among them 46 oral presentations.
Transparency of review process. Like previous years, we adopted a "double blind" review policy. That is, the author(s) of each paper did not get to know the identity of the reviewers and vice versa throughout the review process, as opposed to a "single blind" peer review which keeps only the identity of the reviewer(s) anonymous. ACs got to know the identity of the reviewers and the author(s), for the papers under their responsibility. During the discussion phase, reviewers who reviewed the same papers got to know each others' identity. Lastly, PCs and program managers had access to all information about the submissions, the ACs, the reviewers, and the authors.
Detailed analysis
In this section, we present details of our analysis of the review data and the associated results. All t-tests conducted correspond to two-sample t-tests with unequal variances; all mentions of p-values correspond to two-sided tail probabilities; and all mentions of computation of confidence intervals via bootstrapping use the method in Chapter 5 of Efron and Tibshirani (1994) . top 0.1%) Impact 6.5 % 36.1 % 45.7 % 10.5 % 1.1 % Quality 6.7 % 38.0 % 44.7 % 9.5 % 1.1 % Novelty 6.4 % 34.8 % 48.1 % 9.7 % 1.1 % Clarity 7.1 % 28.0 % 48.6 % 14.6 % 1.8 % Table 1 : Distribution of the reviews according to the provided scores for each of the four features. The column headings indicate the guidelines that were provided to the reviewers. Observe that the percentage of reviews providing scores of 1, 2 or 3 is significantly higher than the prescribed values.
Distribution across subject areas
Figure 3 plots the distribution per subject area (primary subject area), for the submitted papers and for the accepted papers. Of course the proportions are not identical, but the plots do not show any systematic bias either towards or against any particular areas. The heavy tail in the distributions below also corroborates the significant diversity of topics in the NIPS community. A chi-square test of homogeneity of the two distributions failed to detect any significant difference between the two distributions (p=0.6378).
Review-score distribution and mismatches in calibration
Recall from Section 3.3 that in the review process, for each feature, the reviewers were asked to provide a score on a scale of 1 to 5. Specifically, they were asked to provide a score of 5 for submissions they considered as being in the top 0.1%, a score of 4 for submissions that they deemed to be in the top 3%, and a score of 3 for submissions they deemed to be in the top 30%. In this section, we compare the actual empirical distribution of reviewer scores with the distribution prescribed in the guidelines to reviewers.
We begin by computing the distribution of the mean value (across reviewers) of the score per paper for different features, separated according to the final decisions (Table 1) . We plot these distributions in Figure 4 for each of the four features of clarity, impact, novelty, and quality separately.
At first glance, these histograms and numbers look quite reasonable. However, what was surprising to us was the percentage of papers that received any particular score -see Table 1 . Even though the reviewers were asked to give a paper a score of 3 (poster level) or higher only if they think the paper lies in the top 30% of all papers, about 45% of the scores given by reviewers equaled 3 and 56% of the scores were 3 or higher. Similar effects occurred for scores 4 and 5. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that there were a large number of high-quality submissions to NIPS. Such an improvement in quality has obvious upsides such as uplifting the overall experience of the conference. The downside is that the burden on selecting the accepted papers among all those good submissions is with the area chairs, who now still had to reduce the 50% good papers to 25% accepted papers. A second possible explanation is that the reviewers were not calibrated that well with respect to NIPS paper quality. In either case, we understand that this obviously led to the frustration of many authors, whose papers received good scores but were rejected. One possible solution to this problem would be to report quantiles to the authors rather than raw scores, for example, "you are in the top 10% best papers with respect to impact, top 20% with respect to clarity" etc.
In addition to scores for the four features, the reviewer could also indicate whether the paper had a "fatal flaw". Interestingly, a whopping 32% of all papers were flagged to have a "fatal flaw" by at least one reviewer.
How much randomness? The messy middle model
The NIPS 2014 experiment (Lawrence and Cortes, 2014) led to the proposal of an interesting "messy middle" model (Price, 2014) . The messy middle model postulates that the best and the worst papers are clear accepts and rejects respectively, whereas the papers in the middle suffer from acceptance decisions that are random and independent of the content of the papers. For instance, three suggested possibilities under a messy middle model that explain the NIPS 2014 results are (Price, 2014) :
(A) 50% of all submitted papers are clear rejects, and everything else is random.
(B) 7% of all submitted papers are clear accepts, and the other 93% are random.
(C) 6% of all submitted papers are clear accepts, 25% are clear rejects, and the rest are random.
While the messy middle model is obviously a stylized model, it nevertheless suggests an interesting investigation into the randomness in the reviews and decisions of the papers that lie in the middle. In this section, we describe such an investigation using the NIPS 2016 data.
We first present the intuition behind this experiment, and subsequently provide the formal description.
Recall that the messy middle model assumes random judgments for the middle papers. If the messy middle model were correct then for any pair of papers in the middle, and any pair of common reviewers, the probability of an agreement on the relative ranking of the two papers must be identical to the probability of disagreement. In order to test this hypothesis, we restrict attention to the papers in the middle, and then measure how far the agreements of the reviewers are from equiprobable agreements and disagreements. An analysis of this quantity for various notions of the "middle" papers yields insight into the messiness in the reviews for papers in the middle.
We now formally present the procedure we followed:
1. Rank order the papers in terms of their mean scores, where the mean is computed across all four features and all reviewers for that paper.
2. Take any value of variables t and b in the interval [0, 1] such that t + b < 1, and remove the top t fraction and bottom b fraction of all submitted papers.
3. For the remaining papers, compute the amount of agreement and disagreement in the reviews and decisions as follows.
• For any reviewer i and any paper j, compute s i,j as the mean of the scores given by reviewer i to paper j across the four features. Now consider any pair of papers (say, paper 0 and paper 1) and any pair of reviewers who have reviewed both papers (say, reviewer A and reviewer B). We say that the two reviewers agree on this pair of papers if s A,j > s A,1−j and s B,j > s B,1−j for some j ∈ {0, 1}; we say they disagree if s A,j > s A,1−j and s B,j < s B,1−j for some j ∈ {0, 1}; we discard the sample if either s A,j = s A,1−j or s B,j = s B,1−j for any j ∈ {0, 1}. Across all such pairs of papers and reviewers, we let n agree denote the total number of agreements and n disagree denote the total number of disagreements.
• Letting X denote a binomially distributed random variable with (n agree + n disagree ) experiments and a probability of success 0.5, set
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for every value of t and b.
We plot the computed value q t,b for all values of t and b in Figure 5 . (The values of n agree and n disagree are tabulated in Appendix B.) We interpret and analyze these results below.
Before moving on to the analysis, we must make one important remark. In
Step 1 of the procedure described above, we would ideally have liked to order the papers in terms of their "true" rankings. The true rankings are however unavailable to us, and we use the mean scores as a proxy. Nevertheless if the messy middle model were true, and the top and bottom papers were clear accepts and rejects, then the mean scores of the papers outside the messy middle would indeed have been reflective of their positions.
How much mess in the middle? Let us return to the three messy middle scenarios discussed earlier. Note that for decisions in the middle to be random, for appropriate values of t and b, the value of q t,b must be close to 1. Now suppose that the mean score for any paper determines its ranking in the messy middle model. Then:
• Messy middle model (A) postulates random outcomes when (t = 0%, b = 50%). The values obtained from the data are n agree = 183, n disagree = 100 and q t,b = 7.1 × 10 −7 .
• Messy middle model (B) postulates random outcomes when (t = 7%, b = 0%). The values obtained from the data are n agree = 572, n disagree = 285 and q t,b < 10 −12 . These values are computed for the worse case of t = 10%, b = 0%.
• Messy middle model (C) postulates random outcomes when (t = 6%, b = 25%). The values obtained from the data are n agree = 286, n disagree = 145 and q t,b = 7.6 × 10 −12 . These values are computed for the worse case of t = 10%, b = 25%.
More generally, consider a threshold of α = 0.01. As our data and Figure 5 show, q t,b > α only when (t + b) ≥ 50%, or in other words, only when at most 50% papers in the middle are retained. This scenario arises when t = 40% and b = 10%, which is well outside the acceptance regime of top 22% papers. If we restrict attention to t < 22% and b < 78% to ensure inclusion of the decision boundary, then from the data we have that q t,b > α only when at most 40% papers in the middle are retained (when t = 20% and b = 40%).
We also conducted an additional, similar experiment that compared the agreements between reviewers and the final decision. Even for this experiment, we found from the data that q t,b > α only when (t + b) ≥ 85%, that is when at most 15% papers are retained in the middle (this scenario occurs when t = 15% and b = 70%).
According to our post-hoc analysis, we observe that the fraction of papers in the uncertain messy middle region is not as large as what the messy middle model derived from the NIPS 2014 controlled experiment would have predicted (15% to 40% in our analysis for 2016 as compared to over 50% in the 2014 analysis). This statement, however, comes with the caveat that the experiments in this section are performed using the mean score as a proxy for the unknown true ranking of the papers: Admittedly the two types of analyses are not strictly comparable, but these results are encouraging. Nevertheless, since the experiment can easily be performed post hoc using the data from reviews and does not require any special arrangement in the review process, it would be interesting to see how these results compare to the data from other conferences.
Behavior of the different groups of reviewers
In this section, we study the behavior of reviewers conditioned on the groups they belong. Mean scores. We first study how the review and confidence scores differ between the different groups of reviewers such as senior versus junior researchers, or Pool 1 (invited reviewers) versus Pool 2 (volunteer reviewers). In Figure 6 , we plot the mean score provided by each group of reviewers for each individual feature. The sample Pearson coefficient of correlation between the scores given by the two pools across all papers is: clarity: r = 0.38; impact: r = 0.36; novelty: r = 0.41; quality r = 0.43.
We further apply a t-test on observed scores to examine if there is a statistically significant difference in the underlying means of the scores provided by different categories of reviewers. For Pool 1 vs Pool 2, this analysis shows only clarity to have a statistically significant difference between the two pools after accounting for multiple testing. (Specifically, the results for the four features are: quality p=0.0040, novelty p=0.1192, impact p=0.0688, and clarity p=7.0127 × 10 −05 .) Similar analysis between Senior researchers (e.g., Faculty), Junior researchers (e.g., Postdocs), and PhD students shows no significant difference between these categories. (Specifically, the results for senior researcher vs. junior researchers for the four features are: quality p=0.0095, novelty p=0.0036, impact p=0.0194, and clarity p=0.0194; for junior researcher vs. students: quality p=0.6140, novelty p=0.7942, impact p=0.8287, and clarity p=0.3524; for senior researcher vs. students: quality p=0.0299, novelty p=0.0055, impact p=0.0055, and clarity p=0.9771.)
Self-reported confidence. We next study the difference in the self-reported confidence among different groups of reviewers. The mean value of reported confidence is plotted in Figure 7 . In this case, we see a statistically significant correlation between seniority and self-reported confidence. (Senior vs. Junior researcher: p=5.7180 × 10 −11 , Senior researcher vs. PhD student: p=8.4214 × 10 −57 and Junior researcher vs. PhD student: p=8.7522 × 10 −15 ). We observe a similar difference in confidence score between Pool 1 and Pool 2 reviewers (p=2.2671 × 10 −43 .)
Consistency. We now study the consistency within reviewers of Pool 1 (invited), and within reviewers of Pool 2 (volunteer). The consistency captures the amount of variance in the reviews provided by that pool. To this end, consider any pair of reviewers within a given pool, any pair of papers that is reviewed by both the reviewers, and any feature. We say that this pair of reviewers agrees on this pair of papers (for this feature) if both reviewers rate the same paper higher than the other; we say that this pair disagrees if the paper rated higher by one reviewer is rated lower by the other. Ties are discarded. We count the total number of such agreements and disagreements within each of the two pools. Figure 8 lists the fraction of agreements and the fraction of disagreements within each of the two pools for the cardinal scores. Additionally, Section 4.6 presents similar consistency results for the two pools in the ordinal rankings. At this aggregate level, we do not see enough difference to conclusively rate any one pool's intra-pool agreement above the other, and this conclusion is also confirmed by an absence of a statistically significant difference in the proportion of agreements within pool 1 from the proportion of agreements within pool 2. 
Participation in discussions.
One fact that caught our attention was the amount of participation in the discussion by the different reviewer groups: it turned out that senior reviewers take much more active roles in the discussions than junior researchers. Please see Section 4.5.1 for details, where we provide a more detailed study of the discussion phase.
Discussions and rebuttals
This section is devoted to the analysis of the rebuttal stage and the participation of reviewers in discussions. At least one reviewer participated in the discussions for 1554 papers, at least two reviewers for 1215 papers, at least three reviewers for 779 papers, at least four reviewers for 404 papers, at least 5 reviewers for 187 papers, and 6 reviewers participated for 50 of the submitted papers. In total, there were 13656 {reviewer, paper} pairs in the review process, out of which 1239 of the reviews changed some time during the discussion period, and 4189 of the {reviewer, paper} pairs participated in the discussions. There were a total of 5266 discussion posts.
Who participates in discussions?
We compare the degree of participation of various groups of reviewers in the discussion phase of the review process.
Pool 1 (invited) versus Pool 2 (volunteer) reviewers. We compare the participation of the reviewers in two pools in the discussions in the following manner, with the results being plotted in Figure 9 (a). In order to set a baseline, we first compute the total number of {volunteer reviewer, paper} pairs and the total number of {invited reviewer, paper} pairs -these counts are computed irrespective of whether the reviewer participated in the discussions or not. We plot the proportions of these counts as the "Count" bar in the figure. Next we compute the total number of posts that were made by volunteer reviewers and the total number of posts that were made by invited reviewers -the resulting proportions are plotted as the "Posts" bar in the figure. Finally, we compute the total number of {volunteer reviewer, paper} pairs in which that reviewer put at least one post in the discussion for that paper, and the total number of {invited reviewer, paper} pairs in which that reviewer put at least one post in the discussion for that paper. We plot the two proportions in the "Papers" bar.
We tested whether the mean number of posts per {reviewer, paper} pair is identical for the two pools of reviewers. For the null hypothesis that the means are identical for the two pools of reviewers, the t-test yielded a p-value of p = 1.7 × 10 −4 . All in all, we see a greater participation by the invited reviewers as compared to the volunteer reviewers in the discussions.
Student versus non-student reviewers. Likewise, we calculated the above three sets of quantities for student and non-student reviewers: the fraction of such {reviewer, paper} pairs labeled as "Count", the fraction of posts in discussions by each type of reviewer labeled as "Posts", and the fraction of {reviewer, paper} pairs in which the reviewer participated in the discussion labeled as "Papers". Figure 9 (b) depicts the results. We conducted tested whether the mean number of posts per {reviewer, paper} pair for the student reviewers is identical to the non-student reviewers. For the null hypothesis that the means are indeed identical, the t-test yielded a p-value of p = 2.1 × 10 −4 . All in all, we see a greater participation by the non-student reviewers as compared to the student reviewers in the discussions.
How discussions change the scores
Less than 900 reviews out of 13,000 underwent a change in score. As a result, the amount of change in review scores is quite small. Figure 10 depicts the score change -in absolute value -averaged across all reviewers and all papers. While the scores range between 1 to 5, the change in mean score is less than 0.10. This is surprising given the amount of participation in discussions. Several conjectures can be made: either reviewers use discussion to argue or justify themselves but stick to their opinions, or reviewers change their minds but do not bother to change their scores. To disambiguate this, it may be necessary to change the review process and force all reviewers to change or confirm their scores after the end of the discussion session.
Finally, Figure 11 plots the mean change in the scores. While there is a positive correlation between acceptance and a positive change in scores, the correlation is small with very few instances of any change of score. The sample Pearson coefficient of correlation between the change in score and the final decision (accept = 1, reject = 0) is: clarity: r = 0.06; impact: r = 0.07; novelty: r = 0.07; quality r = 0.09. (The associated two-tailed p-values for the t-test, where the null hypothesis is an absence of correlation, are: clarity: p = 7.9 × 10 −11 ; impact p = 4.1 × 10 −14 ; novelty: p = 4.7 × 10 −14 ; quality: p = 7.2 × 10 −25 .)
It is always a matter of debate whether the author rebuttals are useful or not. In our data we cannot separate effects of rebuttals and effects of discussions in general, because both rebuttals and discussions happen in parallel at the same time. What we can say is that even though the authors may not see much change in the scores, there is indeed a non-trivial amount of discussion that goes on behind the scenes after the rebuttal.
Ordinal and cardinal data collection
The data collected from the reviewers in the NIPS 2016 review process comprises cardinal ratings (in addition to the free-form text-based reviews). The reviewers were asked to score each paper on four features on a scale of 1 to 5. A second form of data collection that is popular in many applications, although perhaps not as much in conference reviews, is ordinal or comparative ranked data. An ordinal data collection procedure would ask reviewers to provide comparisons of two or more papers in the form of a ranking. In this section, we discuss these two approaches, with the eventual goal of designing a review system that can leverage the best of both approaches.
We begin by outlining some tradeoffs between cardinal ratings and ordinal rankings. There are several benefits offered by cardinal ratings, namely:
• Make reviewers read each individual paper more carefully.
• May provide more information. For example, a rating from 1 to 5 provides more than two bits of information for each paper, whereas a comparison between a pair of papers provides a total of only one bit for the two papers.
It is perhaps for these reasons that cardinal scores are the popular choice for conference reviews. On the other hand, ordinal rankings or comparisons also enjoy multiple benefits:
• Make reviewers provide more nuanced judgments by requiring them to distinguish between papers and not give identical scores. As a consequence, there are no ties, and this property can result in more information. (See Section 4.6.1 for a quantification of this claim.)
• Free of various biases and calibration issues that otherwise arise in cardinal scores. Non-ties Ties Figure 12 : Proportion of ties in reviewer scores. The bars titled "mean" and "median" represent the mean and median scores across all four features. The error bars representing 95% confidence interval are too small to be seen. The total sample size is 26027.
• It has also been found (Shah et al., 2016a ) that simply converting cardinal ratings to the corresponding ordinal rating can in fact incur a higher noise than when ordinal ratings are obtained directly.
We refer the reader to the papers Barnett (2003), Stewart et al. (2005) , Shah et al. (2016b) and references therein for more details on ordinal data collection and processing.
In light of the aforementioned tradeoffs, we posit that a combination of the cardinal and ordinal approaches can potentially reap the benefits of both data-collection methods. In more detail, we propose collecting cardinal ratings for various individual features of the paper in order to force reviewers to read papers carefully, and then an overall ordinal ranking of all the papers in order to avail the benefits of ordinal data collection methods.
In the main NIPS 2016 review process, we elicited only cardinal scores from the reviewers -one score in 1 to 5 for each of four features. Subsequent to the review process, we then requested each reviewer to also provide a total ranking of the papers that they reviewed. We received rankings from a total of 2189 reviewers.
In what follows, we present the following three sets of analyses with this data:
• In Section 4.6.1 we quantify the number of ties that arise in the cardinal scores, which can be broken through the ordinal rankings.
• We perform three sets of sanity checks in Section 4.6.2 by comparing the amount of inconsistency within and across ordinal rankings and cardinal ratings. The outcome suggests that ordinal rankings should not be ruled out, and supports a call for subsequent controlled experiments.
• In Section 4.7, we use the reported rankings to uncover some glaring inconsistencies in the reviews. We propose the use of such consistency checks in subsequent conferences during the review process itself in order to allow area chairs to correct any errors and better understand reviewer-specific noise.
Tie breaks
An ordinal ranking of the papers provided by a reviewer ensures that there are no ties in the reviewer's evaluations. On the other hand, asking cardinal scores can result in scores that are tied, thereby preventing an opportunity for the AC to discern a difference between the two papers without consulting the textual reviews.
In order to evaluate the prevalence of ties with cardinal scores, we performed the following computation. For every {paper, paper, reviewer} triplet such that the reviewer reviewed both papers, and for any chosen feature, we computed whether the reviewer provided the same score to both papers or not. We totaled such ties and non-ties across all such triplets.
The results are shown in Figure 12 . These results reveal that there is a significant proportion of ties in the cardinal scores given by the reviewers, and this observation further motivates use of ordinal rankings.
Consistency of ordinal ranking data
This section is devoted to performing sanity checks on the ordinal ranking data obtained subsequent to the NIPS 2016 review process. The checks are meant to evaluate whether the ordinal data makes sense. We do so by comparing certain measures of consistency of the ordinal data with the cardinal data obtained in the main review process.
Agreements within ordinal rankings. For every pair of papers that have two reviewers in common, we see if these two reviewers agree on the relative ordinal ranking of the two papers or if they disagree. In more detail, we say that this pair of reviewers agrees on this pair of papers if both reviewers rank the same paper higher than the other in their respective ordinal rankings; we say that this pair disagrees if the paper ranked higher by one reviewer is rated lower by the other. Figure 13 depicts the proportions of agreements and disagreements for the ordinal rankings in the entire set of papers, as well as broken down by the type of reviewer. First, observe that the ordinal rankings have a similar level of consistency as that observed in the cardinal scores in Figure 8 . Second, we observe no statistically significant difference between the two pools (p=0.9851 for Pearson's chi-squared test).
Agreement of ordinal rankings with cardinal ratings. Let us now evaluate how well the overall ordinal rankings associate with the cardinal scores given for the individual features. For every pair of papers that have a common reviewer, we compare whether the relative ordering of the cardinal scores for a given feature agree with the ordinal ranking given by the reviewer for the pair of papers. We report the proportion of agreements and disagreements in Figure 14 .
Observe the high amount of agreement of the ordinal rankings with the cardinal scores -for instance, the median cardinal score agrees in about 90% of cases with the overall ordinal rankings provided by the reviewers.
Agreement of ordinal rankings with final decisions. We finally compute the amount of agreement that the ordinal rankings provided by the reviewers had with the final decisions of acceptance. We consider all {paper, paper, reviewer} triplets where the reviewer reviewed both papers, and one of these papers was eventually accepted and the other was rejected. For every such triplet, we evaluate whether the reviewer had ranked the accepted paper higher than the rejected paper ("agreement") or vice versa ("disagreement"). We report the proportion of agreements and disagreements in Figure 15 .
From Figure 15 we see that the agreement of the overall rankings with the eventual decisions is quite high -there are roughly five agreements for every disagreement. Note that the ordinal rankings were unavailable when the acceptance decisions were made, and hence the actual decisions were not directly based on them. Discussion. The results described throughout this section (as well as in Section 4.7) strongly suggest ordinal rankings as a viable option for collecting reviewer opinions. Taking intuition from our analysis, we posit a hybrid method of data collection involving collecting cardinal scores for individual features and an overall ordinal ranking of all the papers reviewed by any reviewer. A successful pursuit of this idea requires work in at least two directions. The first, empirical direction is to perform controlled experiments in order to quantify the benefits and possible issues with ordinal rankings. The second direction is to design algorithms to efficiently combine cardinal ratings for features and ordinal overall rankings, for instance via a cleverly designed ensemble method or otherwise, which can provide useful guidelines to area chairs for their decisions.
Blatant anomalies
In this section, we propose an automated technique to help reduce some human errors and inconsistencies in the review process. In particular, we propose to automatically check for any blatant inconsistencies in the review ratings provided by the reviewers. On finding any such inconsistency, we propose to then have the area chairs either manually investigate this inconsistency or to manually or automatically contact the reviewer requesting an explanation. In what follows, we propose two notions of inconsistencies in regards to the NIPS 2016 review process, and quantify their presence in the NIPS 2016 review data. Anomalies in feature ratings. We investigate whether any reviewer indicated that paper "A" is strictly better than paper "B" in all four features, but rank paper "A" lower than paper "B" in the ordinal ranking. To our surprise, we find that there are 96 such reviewers.
Anomalies in fatal flaws. We now investigate if there are cases when a reviewer indicated a fatal flaw in a paper, but that reviewer ranked it above another paper that did not have a fatal flaw according to the reviewer. We found 354 such cases. The proportion of such cases is similar among volunteer and invited reviewers.
One may think that the number of such cases is large because ordinal survey was done after the review process, so people may not have remembered the papers well or may not have done a thorough job as they knew it would not count towards the reviews. However, the ordinal data actually is quite consistent with the cardinal data, as we saw in the earlier sections. Hence we do not think such a large discrepancy with fatal flaws can be explained solely due to this delay-related noise.
Constructive suggestion. Two possible explanations for such anomalies are as follows. Either the reviewer may not have done an adequate job of the review, or the set of provided features are grossly inadequate to express reviewers' opinions. In either case, we suggest automatically checking for such glaring inconsistencies (irrespective of whether ordinal or cardinal final ratings are used) during the review process, and contacting the respective reviewers to understand their reasoning. 6 We hope that such a checkpoint will be useful in improving the overall quality of the review process.
Assignment of reviewers
In order to ensure that the information about each paper "spreads" across the entire system, it is important that there is no set of reviewers or papers that has only a small overlap with the remaining reviewers and papers (e.g., Olfati-Saber et al., 2007 , Shah et al., 2016a . To analyze whether this was the case, we considered two graphs. We built a reviewer graph that has reviewers as vertices, and an edge between any two reviewers if there exists at least one paper that has been reviewed by both of them. Analogously we built a paper graph, where vertices represent papers, and we connect two papers by an edge if there exists a reviewer who has reviewed both papers. Note that the graph structure was in part dictated by a constraint on the maximum number of papers per reviewer, as well as the specified number of reviewers per paper.
Our objective is to examine the structure of the graphs and determine if there were any separated communities of nodes. There are many methods to find communities of nodes in a graph, and here we focus on a method based on spectral clustering. Formally, denote any graph as G = (V, E) where V is set of nodes, and E is the set of (undirected) edges between nodes, and |V | is number of nodes in the graph. We can denote graph connectivity by its associated adjacency matrix A which is an (|V | × |V |) matrix; we have A ij = 1 if there is an edge between nodes i and j and A ij = 0 otherwise. With this notation, a quantity known as the "conductance" Φ of any set of nodes S ⊂ V is then defined as:
where V \S is the complement of set S. A lower value of the conductance indicates that the nodes in the cut are less connected to the remaining graph. Next, with a minor abuse of notation, the conductance of a graph as function of cluster sizes is defined as:
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , |V | − 1}. The plot of k versus Φ(k) is called a Network Community Profile or NCP plot (Leskovec et al., 2008) . The NCP plot measures the quality of the least connected community (lowest conductance) in a large network, as a function of the size of the community. While computing the function Φ(k) exactly may be computationally hard, an approximate value can be computed using a simple "second left eigenvector" procedure (Section 2.3 of Benson et al., 2015) . A well connected graph would have a smooth plot of Φ(k) with a minima at around k = |V |/2. decreases smoothly and reaches its global minimum when half of the nodes are in one cluster and the other half in another cluster, indicating an absence of such a fragmentation.
In Figure 17 , we plot the graph of reviewers and papers using the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm (Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991) . In these figures we identify the set of nodes that are identified using the aforementioned NCP method; these nodes are colored black (dark) in the figure in contrast to the blue (light) color of the remaining nodes. We can see from the Figure 17 that these nodes are on the periphery of the network with lower connectivity compared to the rest of the graph.
We further examine the cluster of reviewers in NIPS 2015 which is not well connected with the rest.
In Figure 18 , we plot the decomposition of this set in terms of the primary subject areas indicated by the reviewers. Our analysis reveals that a bulk of this cluster comprises a single subject area, that of reinforcement learning. Conversely, 50 out of 78 reviewers who identified their subject area as lie in this cluster. All in all, graph connectivity issues of this form can lead to increased noise or bias in the overall decisions. Our main message for future conferences is to employ such methods of graph analysis in order to catch issues of this form at a global level (not just local to individual ACs) before the reviews are assigned.
Discussion and conclusions
What happens when machine learning researchers become in charge of running the review process of a large conference? Naturally, they try their best to apply tools they are familiar with to improve on the quality of the selected papers and the fairness of the evaluation (hopefully two goals that are not incompatible!) NIPS has historically been the terrain of much experimentation to improve the review process and this paper is our contribution to advance the state of the art in review process design. In this paper, we reported an analysis of the NIPS 2016 review process. Controlled experiments have not been run, because they impose a big additional work burden on an already titanesque task. However, we paid particular attention to quality control and quality assurance: One of the main contributions of this paper is a methodology to analyse review processes, and the source code for this analysis will made publicly available at: https://github.com/btabibian/conference-analysis Such tools include several means of detecting potential artifacts or biases, and statistical tests to validate hypotheses made: Comparing the distribution of topics in submitted papers and accepted papers; Creating a graph of proximity of reviewers (according to commonly reviewed papers) and papers (according to common reviewers) to detect potential disconnected communities; Test to compare two pools of reviewers. We also proposed a method to evaluate the size of the "messy middle", which can be used to some extent to evaluate the overall quality of the review process with respect to limiting arbitrariness in decisions.
Selection biases that arise when recruiting reviewers and ACs in a review process of this scale are difficult to deal with. Some designs in the selection of reviewers lend themselves more to bias than others. In NIPS2016, we made some design choices of the review process with the intention of reducing these biases. For instance, the recruitment of volunteer author-reviewers helped increase the diversity of the reviewer pool. They were less prone to selection bias compared to selecting reviewers by invitation only, primarily based on AC recommendations. With respect to reducing bias across AC decisions, we introduced the "AC buddy system" in which pairs of ACs had to make decisions jointly about all their papers. This method scales well with the increase in number of papers, but is sub-optimal to calibrate well decisions since buddy pairs form disjoint decision units (no paper overlap between buddy pairs). However, decision processes based on a conference between several or all ACs, as done in earlier editions of the conference, are also not perfect because decisions are sometimes dominated by self-confident and/or opinionated ACs. Although the evidence we gathered from our analyses did not reveal any "obvious" bias, it does not mean that there is none. We hope that some designs of our review process will shed some lights on ways of improving bias-immune or bias-avoidance procedures for future conferences.
We evaluated the new system we introduced using multiple quantitative review criteria. This revealed that the quality of submitted papers may have exceeded the reviewers' expectations: the histogram of scores obtained included a significantly larger fraction of papers than the guidelines suggested (for example, about 50% of papers were judged poster level (or better) when only 22% of papers were accepted in the end; about 10% were judged of oral quality but only 3% were accepted as oral, and 1% was judged award level, but the number of awards is less than 0.1%. To keep authors of rejected papers informed on this, it would be better to report quantiles rather than the original scores to make them self-calibrating to changing levels of paper acceptance from year to year.
We would like to conclude this discussion with a few qualitative statements. Our statistical analysis did not capture all aspects of this complex review process and was limited to examining review scores and decisions, not the textual contents of the reviews, rebuttals, and discussions.
Admittedly, there is such a large number of people involved in the review process that it is hard to control everything. But beyond what numbers revealed in this article, we feel confident of the quality of the review process, judging from the amount of work most ACs put into it (unavoidably there was a handful of ACs who we believe did not put enough effort, as is bound to happen in a set of 100 people).
The reviews themselves were of mixed quality, but recruiting more reviewers (between 4 and 6 per paper) ensured that each paper had a better chance to get a few competent reviews. We gave a strong role to the ACs who arbitrated between good and bad reviews and made the final decision, which was not just based on an average score. To recruit more reviewers (and possibly a more diverse and less biased set of reviewers) we introduced the new idea to invite volunteer author reviewers, which we think is a good contribution. In particular, next to many PhD students, this brought a considerable amount of senior reviewers in the system as well. Some of the ACs systematically disregarded volunteer reviews, judging that they could not be trusted. But, our analysis did not reveal that reviewers from that pool made decisions significantly different from the pool of reviewers invited by recommendation. However, more senior reviewers seem to put more effort into providing detailed reviews, and participating to rebuttals and discussions. Hence we need to find means of encouraging and possibly educating more junior reviewers to participate in these aspects. As a means of self-assessment and encouragement, reviewers could receive statistics about review length, amount of agreement between reviewers, and participation to rebuttals and discussions, as well as figures concerning their own participation. Naturally, the participation of junior reviewers in the review process is a form of education. It would be nice to track from year to year whether individual reviewers ramp up their review length, level of agreement with other reviewers, and participation in discussions and rebuttals. Note that we believe that such statistics should not be used as a means of selecting reviewers because this could bias the selection.
It is an on-going debate to which extent the decision process should be automated and what means could be used to automate it. We provide some elements to fuel this discussion. We evaluated how rebuttals and discussions change the scores. Although this concerns only a minority of papers, we believe that ACs have a key role in arbitrating decisions when there is a controversy and that this is not easy to monitor merely with scores. Since scores do not seem to be consistently updated by reviewers after rebuttal/discussions, maybe the review process should include a score confirmation to make sure that absence of change in score is not due to negligence. Decision suggestions automatically computed on the basis of reviewer scores could be provided to the ACs to facilitate the decision process and reduce the problem of AC calibration. Mixing ordinal and cardinal scores may reduce the problems of reviewer calibration, tie breaking, and identifying anomalies possibly due to human error.
All in all, it is important to realize that in a review process of this scale, there is not a single person who really controls what is going on at all levels. Program chairs spend a lot of time on quality control, but definitely cannot control the decisions on all individual papers or the quality of individual reviewers. In the end, we have to trust the area chairs and reviewers: the better reviews all of you provide, the better the outcome of the NIPS review process. We as a community must also continue to strive improving the peer-review process itself, via experiments, analysis, and open discussions. This topic in itself is a fertile ground for future research, with many useful open problems including design of aggregation algorithms, incentive schemes, as well as statistical tests to evaluate the quality of peer reviews.
B Messy middle agreement values
Here are the values of the number of agreements n agree and the number of disagreements n disagree for every value of t and b from Section 4.3. It is these values that lead to Figure 5 and the analysis in Section 4.3. It will be interesting to see how these agreement/disagreement values compare with other conferences.
The agreement values n agree are: The disagreement values n disagree are: 0 % 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% bottom % papers removed (b)
